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Abstract 
This article contributes to the historiography on human rights and (religious) internationalism by 
tracing how the ecumenical movement in the post-war decades sought to protect the religious freedom 
of its co-religionists in Catholic and Muslim countries, specifically Italy, Nigeria, and Indonesia. In co-
operation with local actors, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs sought to anchor 
international human rights in the domestic sphere through constitutional provisions. These activities 
constituted a significant strand of Christian human rights engagement from the 1940s to the 1960s, 
which intersected with the Cold War and decolonisation. The article then contrasts this with the turn to 
a more pluralistic and communitarian conception of human rights in the 1970s, animated by liberation 
theologies. As the World Council of Churches embraced a ‘revolutionary’ tradition and worked to 
resist military dictatorships, racism, and global inequality, it gravitated towards Marxism-inflected and 
anticolonial strands of human rights discourse. 
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Introduction 
The World Council of Churches (WCC), provisionally founded in 1938, was officially established in 
Amsterdam in 1948, just a few months before the United Nations promulgated the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. According to Terence Renaud, ecumenical Christians around this time 
saw in human rights ‘a universalist commitment to defending individual human beings and a global 
institutional framework for enacting that commitment’.1 As Pamela Slotte has noted, the ecumenical 
conception of individual freedom differed from a secular liberal viewpoint in that it was embedded in a 
religious conception of community: ‘The freedom to which the Christian was delivered was a freedom 
that was envisioned within the framework and in relation to a life in a community (instituted by 
Jesus).’2 Comparing Protestants to Catholics (who did not join the WCC) in this respect, Renaud has 
written that in the late 1930s, ecumenists’ ‘Protestant personalism (…) said little about the sort of 
communal rights and duties that lay at the core of Catholic personalism’ and instead ‘called for a 
                                                 
1
 Terence Renaud, ‘Human rights as radical anthropology: Protestant theology and ecumenism in the transwar era’, The 
Historical Journal, 60, 2, 2016, pp. 3. 
2
 Pamela Slotte, ‘“Blessed are the peacemakers”: Christian internationalism, ecumenical voices and the quest for human 
rights’, in Pamela Slotte and Miia Halme-Tuomisaari, eds., Revisiting the origins of human rights, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, pp. 327, 311. 
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universal community of faith that would recognise no distinctions based on nation, race, or class’. 
American ecumenists like John Foster Dulles and O. Frederick Nolde, empowered by the abundance of 
resources and influence of the American ecumenical movement, then led the way in coupling this 
desire for a ‘universal church’ with designs for a post-war international order, a key feature of which 
would be human rights.
3
 
Religious freedom featured as the linchpin of such an order, because without it all other rights 
would lose their meaning. Linde Lindkvist has recently described how Nolde, as a non-governmental 
consultant at the drafting of the Universal Declaration, worked with fellow ecumenist and drafter 
Charles Malik, the Lebanese Ambassador to the UN and to the US, to shape the secular language of the 
Universal Declaration in such a way as to promote a Christian agenda. The outcome was a text that 
distinguished between inward freedom of conscience on the one hand and outward manifestations of 
religion on the other; that included an explicit freedom to change one’s religion or belief; and that 
focused, despite a reference to manifesting one’s religion ‘in community with others’, on individual 
rights. The latter point ran counter to ecumenical objectives, which had envisioned greater room for 
corporate rights, to better protect the rights of churches. But the former two represented achievements 
of the ecumenists’ lobby, which was based on the concern that mere freedom of ‘worship’ would 
enable regimes hostile to religion to curtail religious freedom, and the specifically missionary worry 
that in Islamic countries, missionary activity would be hampered by prohibitions of conversion.
4
 The 
                                                 
3
 Renaud, ‘Human rights’, pp. 8 and 20. Cf. Samuel Moyn, Christian human rights, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015. On the ecumenical movement and on religious freedom see John Nurser, For all peoples and all 
nations: Christian churches and human rights, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005; Andrew Preston, 
Peripheral visions: American mainline Protestants and the global Cold War’, Cold War History, 13, 1, 2013, pp. 109-30; 
Andrew Preston, Sword of the spirit, shield of faith: religion in American war and diplomacy, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2012; Anna Su, Exporting freedom: religious liberty and American power, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. 
4
 Linde Lindkvist, Religious freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017. 
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Universal Declaration’s Article 18 became the cornerstone of religious liberty promotion by ecumenists 
and others.
5
 
How did ecumenical human rights promotion develop from the 1940s onwards? How did the 
relationship between religious liberty and human rights evolve over time? And what does this tell us 
about the wider arc of ecumenical internationalism through the 1970s? These questions are important 
not only for the history of the ecumenical movement but also for the recent historiography on human 
rights. This historiography has sought to trace continuities and discontinuities in human rights 
discourse and to relate these to wider international histories.
6
 The 1940s and the 1970s have received 
particular scrutiny as sites of supposed human rights ‘revolutions’ or ‘breakthrough’ moments. The 
ecumenical movement, which represented hundreds of millions of Christians in the West and 
increasingly worldwide, represents an important but understudied aspect of this history. 
Most literature on the ecumenical movement, and the limited amount of work that has been 
done on its human rights engagement, has focused on its relationship to communism in the context of 
the Cold War.
7
 One reason for this has been the process of the WCC’s own reckoning with its position 
in the Cold War; another has been scholarly interest in (American) Christian anticommunism and a 
focus on evangelical rather than ecumenical Christians.
8
 While not denying the importance of religious 
freedom in communist countries, the first part of this article calls attention to the two other pillars of 
ecumenical human rights engagement from the 1940s to the 1960s: religious liberty in Roman Catholic 
and Islamic countries. The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), of which 
                                                 
5
 See Ninan Koshy, ‘The ecumenical understanding of religious liberty: the contribution of the World Council of Churches’, 
Journal of Church and State, 38, 1, 1996, pp. 137-54. 
6
 See inter alia Samuel Moyn, The last utopia: human rights in history, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2010; Jan Eckel, Die Ambivalenz des Guten, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014; Mark Philip 
Bradley, Reimagining the world: Americans and human rights in the twentieth century, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016. 
7
 Július Filo, ed., Christian world community – and the Cold War: international research conference in Bratislava on 5 – 8 
September 2011, Bratislava: Comenius University, 2012; Dianne Kirby, ‘The impact of the Cold War on the formation of 
the WCC’, in Joachim Garstecki, ed., Die Ökumene und der Widerstand gegen Diktaturen: Nationalsozialismus und 
Kommunismus als Herausforderung an die Kirchen, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2007, pp. 135-58; Katharina Kunter, Die 
Kirchen im KSZE-Prozess 1968-1978, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2000. 
8
 Cf. David A. Hollinger, ‘After cloven tongues of fire: ecumenical Protestantism and the modern American encounter with 
diversity’, Journal of American History, 98, 1, 2011, pp. 22. 
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Nolde served as director from 1946 to 1968, alongside its chairman, the British layman Kenneth G. 
Grubb, was the central actor in this respect.
9
 A small non-governmental organisation with consultative 
status at the UN, it represented not only the WCC but also the International Missionary Council (IMC). 
After the adoption of the Universal Declaration, it continued its work at the UN, as recently described 
by Karsten Lehmann.
10
 But beyond the UN, extensive contacts with Christian (mostly Protestant) 
organisations and religious leaders allowed the CCIA to engage on a national level. In this sphere, the 
universal norms elaborated at the UN had to be reconciled with local circumstances, as mediated by 
local actors. To investigate the relationship between religious liberty and human rights in such specific 
cases, the first part of this article looks at Italy, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Ecumenical activity in relation 
to these and other countries constituted a substantial strand of ecumenical human rights engagement 
from the 1940s through the 1960s.  
 The second, shorter, part addresses the WCC’s rethinking of its internationalism in the 1960s 
and 1970s, which went hand in hand with fundamental shifts in its membership and ideology. These 
shifts redirected the ecumenical movement’s political alignment to take account of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, initiatives for a New International Economic Order, and perspectives emanating from or 
focusing on what was referred to as the Third World more generally. This development culminated in 
the propagation of a new human rights conception in the mid-1970s, which downgraded the importance 
of religious liberty and elevated social, economic, and collective rights, in line with precepts derived 
from Latin American liberation theologies. The article engages recent interpretations of this new 
ecumenical approach to human rights and argues that several of its features represented important 
discontinuities. Whereas it had previously focused on aiding co-religionists, the WCC now framed a 
wide range of causes in terms of human rights. In a departure from the more institutional and legalistic 
                                                 
9
 On the formation of the CCIA, see Matti Peiponen, Ecumenical action in world politics: the creation of the Commission of 
the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), 1945-1959, Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2012. For more on the early 
WCC, see Jurjen A. Zeilstra, European unity in ecumenical thinking 1937-1948, Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 
1995. 
10
 Karsten Lehmann, Religious NGOs in international relations: the construction of ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’, New 
York: Routledge, 2016, ch. 5. 
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approach of the 1940s and 1950s, the ecumenical movement now incorporated human rights into the 
core of its social ethics and sought to support grassroots struggles for emancipation, especially in the 
Third World. 
 
Religious freedom in Catholic countries: Italian Protestants, human rights, and the constitution 
Protestant ecumenists, seeking to safeguard freedom for their co-religionists in the post-war period, 
saw several threats in the Catholic world. The three most important cases in which Protestants faced 
religiously motivated discrimination or repression were Italy, Spain, and Colombia. Allegations of 
collusion with international communism were an important factor in branding tiny Protestant minorities 
suspect. But fundamentally, Protestantism was perceived as a threat to the moral foundations of 
Catholic societies, in which the Church played a prominent and pervasive role. To the Roman Catholic 
Church at this time, ‘religious freedom’ was anathema, because ‘error has no rights’.11  
The CCIA worked with local church leaders or missionaries, using a mixture of public and 
private engagement to pry open greater space for religious practice and evangelisation in the face of 
what was frequently referred to as Catholic ‘totalitarianism’. Changes in constitutional and other legal 
provisions were the most important means of doing so. The 1950 WCC Central Committee meeting, 
which discussed a study on ‘Religious Freedom in Face of Dominant Forces’, which the CCIA had 
produced at its request, focused on such safeguards.
12
 The example of Italy shows how the ecumenical 
movement could appeal to human rights as part of its efforts to advance religious freedom. Yet even 
more so, it shows how contingent resort to this tactic was. Other sources of moral and legal authority, 
most importantly the 1948 constitution, despite its flaws, presented more promising opportunities. Even 
so, the hegemony of Catholicism in Italy and other Roman Catholic countries proved hard to dent, let 
                                                 
11
 Quoted in John Pollard, The papacy in the age of totalitarianism, 1914-1958, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, pp. 
476. 
12 
WCC, Central committee of the World Council of Churches: minutes and reports on the third meeting, Geneva: WCC, 
1950, pp. 13. 
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alone dislodge. When the situation for Protestants improved, this was mainly due to the developments 
surrounding the Second Vatican Council. 
After the Second World War, Italian Protestants saw in the country’s draft peace treaty an 
opportunity to obtain guarantees for religious non-discrimination.
13
 American ecumenists were their 
most important international allies. When Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, the founder of the Italian 
Christian Democracy party, visited the US in 1947, the Federal Council of Churches of the Churches of 
Christ in America appealed to both the draft peace treaty as well as the UN Charter and its own 
statements on religious liberty in urging him to secure religious freedom in the new constitution.
14
 But 
in the end the peace treaty merely protected ‘freedom of religious worship’ rather than ‘freedom of 
religion’. This had been the result of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s personal opposition to 
proposals to include the latter clause, which Nolde had pressed the United States to advance.
15
 In 
subsequent approaches, Italian Protestants continued to refer to the peace treaty but also tried to draw 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in addition to the 1948 constitution. In May 1950, the 
Federal Council of the Evangelical Churches in Italy presented an open letter to the Italian government, 
asserting that laws favouring the Roman Catholic Church were ‘completely opposed’ to the Italian 
constitution  as well as ‘the international pledge taken by Italy (UNO’s Declaration of Human Rights, 
Art. 15 of the Peace Treaty)’.16 The Waldensian Professor Mario Rollier, the chairman of the CCIA’s 
Italian counterpart, urged that external pressure be placed on the Italian government to make this appeal 
more effective. The CCIA responded with a resolution expressing its ‘approval and support of the 
efforts to achieve non-discriminatory constitutional, legal, and administrative safeguards for religious 
freedom in Italy’, and publicised the efforts of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Churches in Italy 
                                                 
13
 CCIA, The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 1950-1951, London and New York: CCIA, 1951, pp. 32. 
14
 World Council of Churches Archives, Geneva, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (henceforth WCCA 
CCIA) 428 Country files Europe / Italy 1946-1967 / Italy 1952-1953 Human rights, religious liberty [box not numbered], 
Federal Council of Churches to Alcide de Gasperi, ‘Memorandum’, 13 January 1947. 
15
 O. Frederick Nolde, Free and equal: human rights in ecumenical perspective, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1968, 
pp. 33-5. 
16 WCCA CCIA 428.4.3 ‘Memorandum of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Churches in Italy to the Italian 
Government’, 25 May 1950, pp. 1. 
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to its constituency.
17
 Also, in the same year, on the WCC’s initiative, the Conference of Protestant 
Churches from European Latin Countries was established, which brought together Protestants from 
Portugal to Wallonia. The conference issued a statement which, inter alia, expressed the hope that 
Italian law would be brought into accordance with the ‘principles’ of the 1948 constitution and called 
for the Catholic Church to clarify its position on the Universal Declaration’s Article 18.18  
Yet by the mid-1950s, appeals to the constitution had displaced human rights language. On the 
occasion of Italian Prime Minister Mario Scelba’s 1955 visit to the US, the Federal Council of the 
Evangelical Churches in Italy drew up a memorandum which was transmitted to the CCIA, which then 
liaised with the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA (formerly the Federal Council). 
Human rights language did not play any direct role in either the Italian memorandum or the American 
one based on it, which was transmitted to Scelba on the occasion of his visit (the Council had attempted 
to arrange a meeting with Scelba but was rebuffed).
19
 The recent American move away from 
international human rights, under pressure from the Bricker Amendment campaign, may have dimmed 
hopes for an appeal to human rights. Thus, the Italian memorandum appealed to the 1948 constitution 
and asserted that ‘respect for the rights of minorities of any kind is the test of any true democracy. If 
this test should fail under the pressure of any sort of totalitarianism – manifest or disguised, political or 
confessional – the foundations of all liberties would be in danger.’20 The Council thus attempted to 
burnish its perceived loyalty to the Italian state and place itself alongside the Catholic Church in the 
fight against totalitarianism. Rather than human rights, it invoked minority rights. This emphasis on an 
established tradition of minority rights could also be seen in the work of Giorgio Peyrot, the head of the 
                                                 
17 
WCCA CCIA 428.4.3 CCIA, Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Executive Committee, Emmanuel College, Toronto, 
Canada, 3 – 5 July 1950, pp. 29-30. 
18
 WCCA Commission of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service 425.02.08.012.2b, Giorgio Peyrot, ‘La liberté  
religieuse. Son fondement theologique et ses formes concrètes. Deuxième rapport’, no date [1958], pp. 102-3. 
19
 WCCA CCIA [unprocessed materials] 428 Country files Europe / Italy 1946-1967 / Italy 1952-1953 Human rights, 
religious liberty, Mario Lucelli to Earl Frederick Adams, 14 March 1955. 
20
 WCCA CCIA [unprocessed materials] 428 Country files Europe / Italy 1946-1967 / Italy 1952-1953 Human rights, 
religious liberty, Federal Council of Evangelical Churches in Italy, ‘Memorandum on the problem of religious liberty in 
Italy’, 17 February 1955, pp. 6. 
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Legal Office of the Federal Council of Evangelical Churches in Italy, and highlighted the fact that the 
concern of Italian Protestants was less with the freedom to evangelise than with the freedom simply to 
practise their own religion without suffering discrimination.
21
 The American memorandum, signed by 
Eugene Carson Blake, the future General Secretary of the WCC, likewise referred to the constitution 
and appealed to the international standing of Italy in the context of ‘the struggle in which we are all 
engaged, against the menace of atheism and materialism, and, in the positive sense, for justice, freedom 
and peace’.22 These entreaties were fruitless: in the wake of Scelba’s visit, American willingness to 
press Italy on religious freedom declined.
23
  
 Italian Christians viewed the 1948 constitution as an effective tool to promote religious freedom. 
Rather than demanding change in the constitution, they insisted on its implementation. Indeed, a 
January 1959 memorandum of the Legal Office of the Federal Council of Evangelical Churches in Italy, 
submitted for the consideration of the WCC’s July 1959 Executive Committee meeting, noted that the 
constitution’s provisions on the ‘individual’ and the ‘general and collective plane’ were in fact 
‘satisfactory’. But on the ‘institutional plane’, the formal equality between religious denominations, the 
constitution was seen as sorely lacking. Through its Article 7, the constitution was bound by the 1929 
Lateran Pacts with the Holy See, which included a concordat that made Catholicism the de facto state 
church of Italy.
24
 
The long-awaited establishment of Italy’s Constitutional Court in 1956 raised hopes among 
Italian Protestants.
25
 Indeed, it led to improvements in the legal protection of Italian Protestants, not 
least through the abolition of Fascist-era laws restricting church activity and the recognition of the right 
                                                 
21
 E.g. George Peyrot, Religious liberty and conditions of evangelical people in Italy, Rome: Tip. Ferraiolo, 1957. 
22
 WCCA CCIA [unprocessed materials] 428 Country files Europe / Italy 1946-1967 / Italy 1952-1953 Human rights, 
religious liberty, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America to Mario Scelba, ‘Memorandum’, 
30 March 1955. 
23
 Roy Palmer Domenico, ‘“For the cause of Christ here in Italy”: America’s Protestant challenge in Italy and the cultural  
ambiguity of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 29, 4, 2005, pp. 651. 
24
 WCCA CCIA 428.4.7 Legal Office of the Federal Council of Evangelical Churches in Italy, ‘Report on the position of 
religious liberty in Italy’, February 1959, pp. 1-2 (italics omitted). 
25
 WCCA Secretariat on Religious Liberty 4226.5.65 Giorgio Peyrot, ‘Relazione annua dell’Ufficio Legale. 1 Luglio 1956 –  
30 Giugno 1957’, no date, pp. 48. 
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of non-Catholic denominations to open their churches to the public without prior government 
approval.
26
 Yet the court’s rulings did not immediately challenge the legitimacy of the Lateran Pacts, 
and it would take many years for a decisive breakthrough to occur. Constitutional Court rulings in 1971 
and 1982 forced the establishment of a new concordat between the Vatican and the Italian state, which 
cleared the way for the signing of long-desired church-state agreements that recognised a number of 
minority religions; the Waldensian Church was the first of these, in 1984.
27
 
Meanwhile, however, the Vatican moved towards a much more tolerant attitude, which reduced 
the incidence of religious discrimination in Italy and elsewhere. The encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963) 
signalled a new Catholic attitude to the concept of human rights. When the Second Vatican Council 
adopted its declaration on religious liberty in 1965, Dignitatis Humanae, the WCC’s authority on the 
subject, the Spanish former Jesuit and theologian Dr A.F. Carillo de Albornoz, voiced disappointment 
over such omissions as the freedom to change one’s religion or belief ‘without consequent social, 
economic, and political disabilities’, as recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
reiterated at the New Delhi Assembly, and noted that the declaration allowed leeway for the state to 
repress efforts at proselytising. Carillo also criticised the Vatican’s declaration for emphasizing certain 
corporate rights while omitting reference to individual rights, in contrast to the Amsterdam statement. 
But all in all, he welcomed the declaration as a manifestation of Christianity putting its house in order, 
furthering its ‘moral leadership’.28 The Catholic Church’s turn marked the beginning of the end of 
Carillo’s work at the WCC. The Joint Working Group of the Roman Catholic Church and the WCC 
concluded in May 1967 that ‘though the theological justification may still differ from one church to the 
other, there is basic agreement on what the principle of Religious Liberty requires in practice’, and in 
the same year the Secretariat on Religious Liberty was disbanded.
29
 The visit of Pope Paul VI to the 
                                                 
26
 Giovanni Bognetti, ‘Political role of the Italian Constitutional Court’, Notre Dame Law Review, 49, 5, 1974, pp. 989. 
27
 Marco Ventura, Religion and Law in Italy, Alphen aan de Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2013, pp. 46-50. 
28
 WCCA CCIA 428.15.3.2.3 Offprint of A.F. Carillo de Albornoz, ‘The ecumenical and world significance of the Vatican 
declaration on religious liberty’, The Ecumenical Review, 18, 1, 1966, pp. 4-6, 16-7, and 26. 
29
 WCCA WCC 4201.4.2 WCC Central Committee, ‘Joint Working Group Between the Roman Catholic Church and the  
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WCC headquarters two years later illustrated how much Protestant-Catholic relations had improved. 
While the position of Protestants in Catholic countries remained unequal or tenuous in many places, the 
issue of religious freedom in these societies was no longer the priority it had been. 
 
Bracing for independence: postcolonial constitutions and Muslim-Christian relations 
Within the ecumenical movement, missionaries were often the first to seek to distance themselves from 
the imperial structures that had enabled much of their work in the first place. During the interwar 
period many ecumenists had come to see imperialism as arising from nationalism, which the universal 
church was meant to restrain.
30
 World War I had shaken their confidence in Europe’s moral standing, 
and World War II delivered another crushing blow. To restore Europe’s Christian character, ecumenists 
like Malik and WCC General Secretary W. A. Visser 't Hooft thought Christianity would have to 
extricate itself both from nationalism at home and imperialism abroad.
31
 The confrontation with 
communism and its real and perceived appeal to colonised peoples, moreover, forced ecumenical 
Christians to come to terms with their ties to empire. If communism represented a threat because of its 
materialism, its promise of universal equality also forced Protestants to scrutinise their own 
connections to the racialised hierarchies inherent in imperial rule.
32
 For missionaries, the imperative to 
disassociate themselves from empire became stronger as prospects for independence drew closer. If 
they were to have any hope of continuing their work in postcolonial societies they would have to 
redeem themselves from the affiliation with colonialism.
33
 According to the missionary historian 
                                                                                                                                                                       
World Council of Churches, Second Report’, August 1967, pp. 10. 
30
 Michael G. Thompson, For God and globe: Christian internationalism in the United States between the Great War and 
the Cold War, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2015. 
31
 Udi Greenberg, ‘Protestants, decolonisation, and European integration, 1885-1961’, Journal of Modern History, 89, 2, 
2017, pp. 314-354. 
32
 Gene Zubovich, ‘The Protestant search for “the universal Christian community” between decolonisation and communism’, 
Religions, 8, 17, 2017. 
33
 For a case study of this process in France and Algeria, see Darcie Fontaine, Decolonizing Christianity: religion and the 
end of empire in France and Algeria, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. On how Jews in northern Africa dealt 
with similar questions, see Nathan Kurz, ‘“A sphere above the nations?”: The rise and fall of international Jewish human 
rights politics, 1945-1975’, PhD thesis, Yale University, 2015, ch. 4. 
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Adrian Hastings, the IMC and the WCC, as well as the Catholic Congregation de Propaganda Fide, 
were the most important bodies worldwide in cultivating a turn away from ‘missionary nationalism’.34  
At the same time, the ecumenical movement as a whole was slow to endorse self-determination 
as a principle, let alone as a right. At a 1956 discussion of the CCIA Executive Committee, which 
intended to clarify the concept of self-determination, the participants distinguished between self-
determination as a ‘principle’ and as a ‘concrete right’ that came into being under ‘certain conditions’ 
but failed to enunciate these to a significant degree. Nolde had to admit in retrospect that because of 
disagreement among the WCC’s constituency on ‘the proper tempo and scope of the decolonisation 
process’, the CCIA took ‘a rather cautious, quite possibly an over-cautious approach to most of the 
colonial issues’.35 Indeed, the CCIA and the churches it represented shared much of the paternalistic 
outlook of colonial governments which legitimated continued colonial rule by reference to nebulous 
criteria of the ‘fitness’ or ‘preparedness’ of the colonised for even limited forms of self-government. 
The CCIA insisted on obtaining the ‘voluntary’ cooperation of colonial powers rather than risk 
‘alienating’ them, ‘having in mind the objective of a voluntary rather than a coerced acceptance by all 
nations of their responsibilities for the well-being of dependent peoples’.36 
Meanwhile, the missionary movement sought to use human rights language to safeguard their 
position in newly independent countries. Missionaries had described religious liberty as a ‘human right’ 
as early as the 1928 Jerusalem conference of the IMC – though they had then paired it with a second 
‘human right’, ‘the maintenance by each nation of law and order for all within its bounds’. At the 1938 
Tambaram conference, influenced by the 1937 Oxford conference, the IMC addressed the tension 
between these two rights by putting forward religious freedom as a condition for the legitimacy of 
                                                 
34
 Adrian Hastings, ‘The clash of nationalism and universalism within twentieth-century missionary Christianity’, in Brian 
Stanley and Alaine Low, eds., Missions, nationalism, and the end of empire, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 15-33. 
35 O. Frederick Nolde, ‘Ecumenical action in international affairs’, in Harold E. Fey, ed., The ecumenical advance: a history 
of the ecumenical movement, vol. 2: 1948-1968, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1993, 1
st
 edn. 1970, pp. 278-9. 
36
 CCIA, The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 1952-1953, London and New York: CCIA, 1953, pp. 35. 
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states: ‘an essential element in a better international order is freedom of religion’.37 In the post-war 
period, during which processes of decolonisation accelerated, the CCIA would assist numerous 
constituents in lobbying for constitutional provisions in line with the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 
and ecumenical statements on religious freedom. The CCIA distributed two documents widely to 
church leaders, one providing advice on how to lobby for religious freedom in constitutions and one 
providing an overview of recently adopted provisions.
38
 In a 1961 article on religious liberty, Nolde 
argued that human rights could be most effectively protected through ‘the mind and will of the people 
as reflected in constitutions, law, courts, and practice. It follows that action to promote the observance 
of human rights, if it is to be meaningful, must be domestic.’ He saw international action as 
complementary to this, especially ‘the very knowledge that the eyes of the world are upon the local 
scene and that world public opinion is increasingly ready to condemn or to commend’.39  
But in practice the CCIA’s activity straddled the domestic and the international spheres. 
Through its activity in influencing constitutions, the ecumenical movement sought to inject its ideals 
directly into the groundwater of the domestic sphere. A key area of ecumenical concern for religious 
freedom was in majority Muslim societies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
40
 This section discusses 
two key cases in which ecumenical human rights discourse played a role in negotiating the future 
relationship between Muslims and Protestants in majority Muslim countries: Indonesia and Nigeria. 
Each represented a large Muslim population (in Indonesia’s case, the world’s largest). While in 
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Indonesia, ecumenists’ initial success soon faced setbacks, the protections of religious freedom applied 
in Nigeria were emulated in numerous other countries emerging from British colonialism.
41
 
 
Religious freedom and the Indonesian transition to independence 
 
In late August 1945, the newly proclaimed Republican government in Jakarta adopted a constitution 
that had been drafted before the Japanese surrender, by the Japanese-established Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesian Independence. The constitution was ‘short and skeletal (…) more like notes 
for a constitution than a comprehensive basis for a new state’.42 The Committee had initially envisioned 
an obligation in the constitution’s preamble for Muslims to abide by Islamic law (part of the so-called 
Jakarta Charter) as well as the requirement that the head of state should be a Muslim. According to M. 
C. Ricklefs, a warning from the Japanese Navy ‘that Christian Indonesians in its area would disapprove 
of any special role for Islam’ led nationalist leaders to abandon these proposals, though they would 
come back to haunt the government in the late 1950s.
43
 In Article 29, the constitution established the 
religious foundation of the state in language acceptable to both Christians and Muslims, and set out a 
provision for freedom of religion: ‘The State is based on the belief in the Divine Omnipotence. (…) 
The State guarantees the freedom of every resident to profess his own religion and to worship 
according to his religion and belief.’44 
Facing the prospect of independence, Christians in Indonesia were apprehensive about their 
future as a small and in many places tiny religious minority. At an August 1946 meeting on the future 
of mission in Indonesia, the sociologist and missionary pastor C. L. van Doorn argued that Dutch 
Christians should avoid taking a defensive posture. This would require them not to cloister themselves 
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or to adopt an air of superiority but instead to join Indonesians ‘“in the establishment of an Indonesian 
state, governed by the rule of law”, guided by the gospel’. 45  However, the second speaker, the 
missionary consul J. C. Hoekendijk, focused on the issue of religious freedom, on the basis of a 
memorandum drafted on his initiative by the ecumenical Contact Commissie Kerk en Zending (Contact 
Commission Church and Mission). This memorandum expressed worries about the possibility of 
Islamic pressure outside the main islands of Java and Sumatra. In his accompanying address, 
Hoekendijk cited historical examples from the Middle East in which Christians were relegated to 
second-class citizenship and gave an overview of ecumenical discussions on the issue of religious 
freedom.
46
 
 The memorandum was sent to Lt. GovernorGeneral H. J. van Mook, the head of the Dutch East 
Indies government. The churches and missionaries quoted as their point of departure the 1944 San 
Francisco statement of the American Joint Committee on Religious Liberty (JCRL), a precursor to the 
Universal Declaration’s Article 18. They explicitly rejected the possibility of safeguarding religious 
freedom through a system of minority rights, because history had shown ‘that the maintenance of the 
rights of a minority in fact never rises above permitting the status quo to be maintained’, whereas 
religion contained a ‘dynamic element’, as revealed through its ‘missionary-expansionary character’.47 
The letter then went on to invoke the UN Charter’s provisions for religious freedom, which the letter 
asserted went beyond freedom of worship to include observance, organisation, and (missionary) 
activities, within the boundaries of the law. The Charter in fact merely mentioned religion in its non-
discrimination clauses, but the UN’s involvement in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict after January 1946 
made it a salient point of reference. The authors also distinguished between a set of six rights that the 
church was due as a religious body, from the establishment of its own liturgy to the freedom to carry 
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out philanthropic work, and five rights of individual believers, including the right to change one’s 
religion and to spread one’s faith through witness and education (stopping short of an explicit right to 
propagate or evangelise). The call to recognise the corporate rights of the church reflected the legacy of 
pre-war ecumenical statements on religious freedom, coming ahead of the Amsterdam Assembly’s 
greater emphasis on the individual believer in its ‘Declaration on Religious Liberty’. 
From 1-12 October 1946, the Dutch East-Indies government held a conference at which it 
solicited the views of minorities on their future in a federal Indonesia. The Dutch theologian J. Verkuyl 
made an appeal not only to religious freedom but to ‘human rights’, while referring to the UN Charter 
and the JCRL’s statement.48  According to Hoekendijk, as a result of Verkuyl’s efforts ‘the short 
Statement on Religious Liberty was officially adopted as a general directive’.49 In November, Verkuyl 
and Hoekendijk’s replacement, U.H. van Beyma, again petitioned the Dutch East-Indies government, 
this time more specifically to safeguard religious freedom in the future Indonesian constitution.
50
 
The efforts by Dutch missionaries seem to have turned from the Dutch to the Indonesians since, 
in the November 1946 Linggadjati Agreement, it was agreed that drafting the provisional constitution 
would be up to the Indonesians.
51
 Hoekendijk recollected that after an address on religious liberty that 
he had given at a missionary conference in Batavia in August 1946, a number of ‘the Indonesians 
present took this address with them to Eastern Indonesia [with its substantial Christian populations] and 
accepted the statement with our interpretation’. He also wrote that ‘the memoranda prepared by our 
group found there [sic] way through under ground [sic] channels to Djokja [Yogyakarta]’, the 
Republican capital. And Hoekendijk recounted, with pride, that he and colleagues including Verkuyl 
had successfully introduced the JCRL’s statement on religious liberty ‘into one of the 
recommendations of an [unspecified] official political meeting’, a fact which they had then referenced 
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to build further support. He also noted the particular utility of having an ecumenical statement to which 
they could refer: ‘We never gave it in Dutch and always pointed to the fact that this was not a Western, 
but an ecumenical principle.’52  
Between 1947 and 1949, the Netherlands undertook two major military offensives to quash the 
Republic of Indonesia, severely damaging the prospects of future bilateral relations and prompting 
international outrage. Dutch missionaries were more critical of these developments than the vast 
majority of churches in the Netherlands, leading to conflict with those who refused to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of Indonesians’ desire for full-fledged independence. At the same time, they continued their 
efforts to promote religious freedom in the federal constitution. In a 1949 memorandum, the 
ecumenical Raad voor de Zending [Missionary Council] quoted Searle Bates’ 1945 A Study of 
Religious Liberty – Hoekendijk, who had received a copy from the American missionary leader A. L. 
Warnshuis after a 1945 visit to New York, would later say it had been ‘our textbook’53 – which stated 
that Indonesia’s Muslims ‘are less fanatical than the more intense people of the Near East’. Yet while 
the Dutch missionaries agreed, they held that ‘throughout all of Islam there [is] visible a certain 
inclination, tendency, with regard to the way in which the community of Christ is approached’.54 
Protestants saw a desire to enable government restriction of missionary activity in attempts by the 
Indonesian Muslim Party to preserve a legal provision known as article 177, which required the 
Governor-General to give missionaries permission to operate in a given area.
55
 Another indicator was a 
recent parliamentary session in the Negara Indonesia Timur, the Dutch-established ‘State of East 
Indonesia’, in which Muslims, joined by Bali Hindus, had passed a law that allowed the interdiction of 
missionary activity if it threatened ‘public order’.56 For the missionaries, abandoning evangelisation 
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was not an option, because ‘this would mean the death of the church (…). So this freedom will have to 
be fought for continuously.’57   
The arsenal from which missionaries drew the weapons to fight for their conception of religious 
freedom was, as in 1946, largely provided by the ecumenical movement’s work on religious liberty, 
now expanded with the Amsterdam Assembly’s 1948 declaration, the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, and a WCC document about ‘The Marxist Conception of Religious Liberty’ (the inclusion of 
this cautionary assessment reflected concerns that communism might become a major force in 
Indonesian politics). Most importantly, the Raad indicated its support for the religious freedom 
provisions suggested for the future Indonesian constitution by Verkuyl in his 1948 dissertation.
58
 The 
memorandum claimed that Verkuyl’s proposal ‘certainly was a source of inspiration in [the constitution 
of the] N[egara].I[ndonesia].T[imur]’, the provisions of which were also provided in full. Verkuyl’s 
proposal included the freedom to evangelise and the right to change one’s religion. According to the 
Raad it was a ‘maximum elaboration of the the [sic] definition of San Francisco’. While its full 
adoption was considered unlikely, it was considered the ideal outcome for which to strive.
59
 
At the July 1949 Inter-Indonesian Conference in Yogyakarta and Batavia, the Republican and 
Federalist factions among the Indonesians worked out a provisional constitution, in which they decided 
to include the full text of the Universal Declaration’s Article 18.60 The Dutch accepted this draft 
without significant change at the Round Table Conference in October.
61
 Nolde observed that the 1949 
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constitution’s provisions on human rights were ‘encouraging’.62 This constitution lasted only a few 
months, as the federal state was overturned in favour of a unitary one, but it was the basis on which the 
1950 provisional constitution was drafted.
63
  
Yet while both the 1949 and 1950 constitutions included human rights provisions based on the 
Universal Declaration, the 1950 constitution was far less explicit regarding freedom of religion. While 
the 1949 constitution had copied the Universal Declaration’s Article 18, the 1950 constitution truncated 
the language to focus only on ‘inner’ freedom: ‘Everyone is entitled to freedom of religion, conscience, 
and thought.’ A separate provision, Article 43, maintained language from the 1949 constitution on the 
religious nature of the state and religious freedom. The government claimed that the two articles 
combined sufficiently covered ‘the intention of’ the Universal Declaration’s Article 18, in allowing for 
evangelisation, the right to change one’s religion, and parental choice in religious education. 64 
Ecumenical Christians worried, however, that the freedom to ‘profess’ one’s religion and the only 
implicit recognition of the right to change one’s religion constituted a substantial reduction in the scope 
of the freedom to manifest religion in Indonesian society. Questioned in parliament, Prime Minister 
Mohammed Hatta explained that the article had been shortened because the previous formulation 
‘could be interpreted as a kind of recommendation to change one’s religion’, as a church periodical 
reported; it added the supposition that Muslim pressure likely explained the change.
65
  
Religious freedom remained contested through the 1950s.
66
 Even before the constitutional 
change, Dutch ecumenists saw the newly established Ministry of Religion as ‘nothing but a Ministry 
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for Moslem Interests’.67 When the process of formulating a permanent constitution began in the late 
1950s, Indonesian Christian representatives, both Protestant and Catholic, pushed for the insertion of 
the Universal Declaration’s Article 18.68 Indonesian Christian leaders such as Rev. W. J. Rumambi and 
J. C. T. Simorangkir, who were also leaders of the Indonesian Council of Churches (founded in 1950), 
participated in the debates and called for the secular nature of the state to be maintained.
69
 These 
debates became deadlocked, because Islamic representatives attempted to insert the Jakarta Charter’s 
phrase on Islamic law while others resisted this.
70
 Meanwhile, Sukarno proposed the establishment of a 
governmental system termed ‘Guided Democracy’, and in 1957 he effectively suspended the 
constitution. On 5 July 1959 Sukarno reinstated the 1945 constitution by decree and stated that the 
Jakarta Charter did not form a legal part of the constitution, thus ensuring the secular character of the 
state.
71
 Yet the return to the 1945 constitution meant a further reduction in the constitutional protection 
of religious freedom and a blow to ecumenical aspirations (as well as a general slide into 
authoritarianism). 
  
Kenneth Grubb and religious freedom in Northern Nigeria 
Nigeria, and especially Northern Nigeria, was an important focus of the CCIA’s work in the 1950s, 
because of the missionary and Christian minority interests there. While the country as a whole was 
characterised by significant religious diversity, including large Christian populations, the North was 
almost two-thirds Muslim, with most others ‘following their tribal beliefs and a small Christian 
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minority’.72 The CCIA had a long-established connection with the churches through the Christian 
Council in Nigeria (founded in 1930). This section focuses on the role of the ecumenical movement in 
bringing about Nigeria’s 1959 bill of rights, which included provisions on religious liberty in line with 
ecumenical desiderata. Once the constitution had enshrined religious freedom, ecumenical leaders in 
independent Nigeria saw in these provisions a key instrument to preserve ‘the right to propagate our 
faith’ (at least until the military coup in 1966, which is beyond the scope of this article).73 
While constitution-making in Nigeria had a long history, with respect to human rights, it 
entered a new phase in the 1950s. In 1953, the Methodist Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the 
Action Group, which represented Nigeria’s Western Region, had taken the initiative in crafting a bill of 
rights for Nigeria. A London-trained lawyer, as well as a teacher and trade union leader, Awolowo 
enlisted the support of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, which controlled the 
Eastern Region, led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. Their joint proposal drew inspiration from the Indian 
constitution (which had in turn drawn inspiration from the United States) and included provisions on 
the freedom of religion. However, the Northern Region opposed the idea of a bill of rights and the 
Colonial Office’s view at the time was that bills of rights were ineffective or even dangerous. 
According to Stanley De Smith, the Secretary of State for the Colonies responded to the proposal of a 
bill of rights ‘by laughing the idea out of the conference room’.74 By 1955, however, as described by 
Charles Parkinson, the Secretary of States for the Colonies and the Governor General of Nigeria had 
both been replaced by officials more sympathetic to bills of rights. The new Governor General, Sir 
James Robertson, also convinced the Northern People’s Congress that a bill of rights could protect the 
population of the Northern Region from discrimination by the southern regions. Thus, the alignment of 
forces had shifted and the notion of a bill of rights started gaining traction. At this time, the Christian 
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Council of Churches in Nigeria and the CCIA, especially its chairman, Grubb – who was also the 
President of the Anglican Church Missionary Society – began to push for the inclusion of religious 
freedom, which would result in its inclusion in the 1959 bill of rights.
75
 
Ecumenical efforts to include the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 in Nigerian constitutional 
provisions got underway in 1955, as the records of a meeting between Grubb, Nigerian church and 
missionary representatives, and the regional government of the North illustrate.
76
 It seems likely that 
such representations were what the Northern Region’s governor referred to when he notified the 
Colonial Office, in August 1955, that ‘people were nervous about the prospect of early self-government 
and the absence, so far, of a Northern “Declaration of Human Rights” with particular regard for 
religious freedom’. Parkinson credits this missive with setting in motion the Colonial Office’s 
acceptance of the need for constitutional protection of religious freedom, though it did not yet want a 
bill of rights.
77
 Subsequently, Grubb had lunch with Tom Williamson, the lead on Nigerian affairs in 
the Colonial Office’s West Africa Department, who showed him the draft proposal for a constitution 
for Northern Nigeria. Grubb made two points regarding religious liberty, namely the need to secure 
freedom to change one's religion and the right of parents to choose their children’s religious instruction, 
both of which were favourably received. However, reporting on the approach, Grubb noted an 
important reservation made by Williamson, who had said that he and his colleagues ‘did not like to 
proceed “by reference to the Declaration of Human Rights” but preferred an approach by reference to 
constitutional provisions which may be obtainable in other colonial constitutions’. Specifically, he had 
in mind the Sudan Self-Government Statute. Williamson ‘attributed this attitude to a general dislike 
both among parliamentarians and higher officials at the Colonial Office to the activities of the United 
Nations in regard to dependent peoples’, an attitude that reflected a dislike of international scrutiny and 
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an attachment to established colonial legislation. Nevertheless, Grubb pressed Williamson to promise 
that he would ‘study Article 18 and other relevant articles in the Declaration’.78 
Article 18 did make its way into Colonial Office policy, after a church and missionary 
delegation met with John Hare, the Minister of State (standing in for the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies), on 16 July 1956. The delegation was led by representatives of the British Council of 
Churches and the International Missionary Council, but also included Grubb, the Rev. Canon C.A. 
Forster, Secretary of the Christian Council in Nigeria, and the heads of the Overseas Council of the 
Church of England and the Free Church Federal Council. Though the CCIA archives do not include 
minutes of the meeting, a document prepared by the British Council of Churches – an important 
constituent of the WCC – setting out its requests, opened with a call to include Universal Declaration 
Articles 18 and 19 into the constitutions being prepared for Nigeria, with special reference to the North, 
because of its government’s ‘substantial Muslim majority’. A line at the end noted that while the CCIA 
‘has been kept informed (…) [it] seemed more convenient to make the present approach through the 
British Council of Churches’. 79  The meeting prompted the Colonial Office to add the Universal 
Declaration’s rights to change one’s religion and to propagate it to the religious freedom provision of 
the Sudan Self-Government Statute. Pressure from the three Nigerian regions at the 1957 constitutional 
conference then contributed to the expansion of this minimalist commitment into a full-fledged bill of 
rights, a departure from long-established British policy.
80
 
The following year, Grubb spent almost a month in Nigeria. In his report on religious liberty he 
wrote that Nigeria was ‘the key area in Christian/Moslem confrontation in Africa’. Grubb worried that 
in the North, with its majority Muslim population, unlike in the East or the West, ‘the new nationalism’ 
might ‘turn against the missionary from overseas’. Meeting with Ahmadu Bello, the premier of 
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Northern Nigeria, Grubb asked him to confirm the right to change one's religion, to which Bello 
‘emphatically’ assented while voicing a qualification with respect to ‘law and order’. Grubb felt that 
Bello’s expressed support for rights and freedoms was ‘probably only words’. At a subsequent meeting, 
the Acting Governor of Northern Nigeria indicated that he shared Grubb's scepticism.
81
 
In Lagos, Grubb met with the newly established Minorities Commission, headed by Henry 
Willink, which had been tasked with addressing calls for minority protections. The otherwise pressured 
and overburdened body indicated that it was eager to receive a memorandum from the Christian 
Council in Nigeria. With Grubb’s assistance in drafting, the Council sent a memorandum to the 
Commission in December 1957, expressing its desire that ‘the Federal and Regional constitutions of 
our country should contain satisfactory guarantees of human rights and freedoms’, in the interests of 
‘the peaceful development of the country and the religious interests of all’, given its nature as a ‘multi-
communal state’. It echoed ecumenical wording in asserting that in such a society, ‘no religion should 
claim or possess rights, privileges, or freedoms which are denied to any other religion’. The appeal 
listed seven specific religious rights, including the freedom to change one’s religion, the freedom of 
parents to choose their children’s religious education, and the freedom ‘to establish and operate 
institutions for religious and charitable purposes’, all long-standing priorities of the CCIA. The 
Christian Council followed up these religious rights with a set of four more general human rights, most 
importantly non-discrimination: ‘the equality of all before the law, regardless of race, tribe, religion, or 
sex’. The document clearly showed the influence of the CCIA, through the focus on particular religious 
rights and the actual wording, as well as through their connection to human rights in general.
82
 
 The intervention by Grubb and his Nigerian-based colleagues dovetailed with the interests of 
the Minorities Commission and the Colonial Office. The report of the Willink Commission made 
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repeated reference to the ‘Christian bodies’ that had made representations on ‘certain fundamental 
rights’, which it singled out for positive comment, as opposed to ‘almost all the witnesses’, who ‘were 
insistent that nothing but a separate state could meet their problems’. These ‘Christian bodies’ were in 
fact only Grubb and the Christian Council in Nigeria, since no other group had called for a bill of rights 
as a means of protecting minorities.
83
 The Commission’s report adhered closely to the desiderata put 
forward in the Council’s memorandum. The drafters of the proposed bill of rights had not taken the 
Universal Declaration as a source but instead (in the absence of a British bill of rights) drawn on the 
European Convention on Human Rights. However, since the latter’s Article 9 was virtually identical to 
the Universal Declaration’s provision, this mattered little with respect to religious freedom. The 
Minorities Commission also included two clauses on religious education borrowed from the Pakistani 
constitution. Strikingly, the report even went on to list six religious rights that it recommended be 
specifically taken up in drafting the constitution, a list apparently lifted almost directly from the 
Council’s memorandum.84 While the Colonial Office refused to take up these latter rights, for fear of 
incurring Muslim outrage, the remaining protections fulfilled ecumenical hopes.
85
 The Nigerian bill of 
rights then served as a model for many other British overseas territories obtaining independence: Sierra 
Leone, Jamaica, Uganda, Kenya, Malta, British Guiana, Aden, and Nyasaland (of Commonwealth 
countries, only Ghana and Tanganyika did not enact ‘justiciable bills of rights’).86 Thus, the activities 
of the CCIA and the Council of Christian Churches in Nigeria had obtained a major coup in securing 
religious freedom provisions in decolonising countries. 
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Human rights as social justice: the ‘revolutionary’ recasting of ecumenical internationalism  
Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the nature of the ecumenical movement changed 
fundamentally, as it became both ‘globalised’ and ‘politicised’. Its membership became less Western, 
and the churches adopted more forthright political stances on an increasing number of issues, with an 
emphasis on questions facing the Third World.
87
 What Justin Reynolds has termed a ‘revolutionary’ 
tradition in ecumenical thought that had simmered below the surface since the 1940s, primarily in the 
World Student Christian Federation, came to the fore.
88
 This was showcased by the 1966 Geneva 
Conference on Church and Society, presided over by the Indian theologian M.M. Thomas. Nearly half 
the delegates were from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, eight observers from the Roman Catholic 
Church attended, and the majority of those present were laypeople (experts on economics, law, 
sociology, but also technical and natural sciences).  
On the one hand, the conference considered concerns of the recently decolonised countries, 
notably ‘the social consequences of decolonisation, such as urbanisation and industrialisation’; on the 
other, it also discussed secularisation and societal changes in Europe, particularly increases in the role 
of technology, diversity, and individualisation. Visser ‘t Hooft, who would retire the same month, 
spoke about the need to expand the concept of the responsible society to that of a ‘responsible world 
society’. This conception echoed efforts since the late 1930s to articulate a universal ‘international 
ethos’. Yet this now encountered resistance from delegates from the Third World and those in favour of 
‘a contextual ethics’, who responded along cultural-relativist lines: Visser ‘t Hooft’s ‘Western-
Democratic’ concept was not universally valid, and what Third World countries needed was systemic 
change and development aid. Delegates from Latin America, notably the Colombian theologian 
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Gonzalo Castillo Cárdenas and the American missionary and theologian Richard Shaull, promoted the 
theological notion of ‘revolution’.89 
The rise of the revolutionary tradition sat uneasily with the established ecumenical approach to 
human rights. Representatives of the former were responding to the severe challenges facing many 
recently independent countries, which led them to focus on socioeconomic questions, both globally and 
locally. But, notwithstanding Nolde and his colleagues’ commitment to the development of UN human 
rights instruments, the CCIA’s human rights agenda remained focused on religious liberty, even as the 
ground supporting this agenda shifted. For example, significant advances at the UN were made during 
this time in relation to race, an area which would soon become a focal point for the WCC’s 
international engagement, yet the CCIA’s reports do not suggest specific interventions, in contrast to its 
focused work on religious liberty.
90
 As an internal overview of its work acknowledged, ‘Racial and 
ethnic tensions have not figured very much in the C.C.I.A. business during the first two decades’.91 
Though the 1966 Geneva conference and the 1968 Uppsala Assembly laid the groundwork for some of 
the changes to come, the predominance of the CCIA’s conception of human rights would only 
gradually be challenged, a process encouraged by the WCC’s new General Secretary, Blake, who 
sought to make the WCC more globally representative.
92
 
It was over the course of the early 1970s that the WCC and CCIA undertook to reconcile human 
rights with the ‘revolutionary’ tradition. The catalyst was provided by ecumenical engagement with 
Latin America, including the rise of military dictatorships, the language of resistance articulated by 
liberation theologians, and interaction with international human rights campaigns. As Patrick William 
Kelly has also shown, the Chilean coup in 1973 spurred the WCC first to set up a massive humanitarian 
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relief effort that moved roughly 10,000 political refugees out of the country, an effort rivalling that of 
the UN in size. But once that crisis had abated, in 1974, the WCC’s support transitioned into support 
for human rights activism. The WCC provided the vital funding for the ecumenical Pro Peace 
Committee (later transformed into the Vicariate of Solidarity) and worked side by side with Amnesty 
International to support it.
93
  
Unlike Amnesty, which had a rigidly circumscribed ‘mandate’, the WCC’s connections with 
Latin-American church leaders led it to embrace a wider agenda than civil and political rights. This 
included efforts at grassroots empowerment and social and economic programs, conceived of both as 
mitigating the military regime and resisting it. In a meeting with the WCC on 31 May 1974, the 
Committee’s leading lawyer, José Zalaquett (who would upon his exile go on to become head of 
Amnesty’s International Executive Committee), argued that the churches were uniquely well-placed to 
take a two-pronged approach to delegitimizing the Chilean regime: they should expose ‘the sham and 
the myth behind’ not only the ‘legality’ of the junta but also its ‘economic justice’, in terms of jobs, 
inflation, and availability of goods and services. Zalaquett argued that the government had ‘in effect 
isolated itself’, alienating even the Christian Democratic party, ‘which was behind the overthrow of the 
Allende government’; ‘even the right wing “gremios” – or professional associations – are affected by 
the economic oppression’.94 Meanwhile Harper cast Chilean issues in not only individual but also, and 
increasingly, in collective terms. For instance, he argued that human rights violations in Chile were ‘a 
mass, and massive problem (...) [which] must be treated, therefore, as a mass problem, and not – as in 
the past – as a [sic] individual problem, by the churches’. He wrote that the churches ought to be ‘the 
defender of the oppressed- not in terms, primarily, of the individual but in terms of groups of people’.95 
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One way of conceiving of such groups, as in a later HRROLA report, was that of a ‘repressed majority’ 
pitted against a ‘rich and powerful minority elite’, but more specific groups could also be identified, 
such as the indigenous peoples of Brazil.
96
 Under the ostensibly apolitical umbrella of human rights, 
then, the WCC supported much more wide-ranging, religiously-inspired and communitarian goals of 
social justice. Such an approach also characterised the new conception of human rights it developed in 
the early 1970s. 
As Annegreth Schilling has described, many exiled Latin Americans came to work for the WCC, 
including the new head of its international representation, the Argentinian-Estonian lawyer Leopoldo 
Niilus, the Brazilian educator Paolo Freire, and the Uruguayan liberation theologian Julio de Santa 
Ana.
97
 As also described by Christian Albers, Niilus and his Study Secretary, the American Rev. 
Dwain C. Epps, oversaw a reworking of the ecumenical conception of human rights over the course of 
several meetings, culminating in a 1974 consultation on ‘Human Rights and Christian 
Responsibility’. 98  This meeting foregrounded African, Asian, and especially Latin American 
perspectives, while also incorporating Eastern European ones. The outcome of this meeting was then 
endorsed by the 1975 Nairobi Assembly, which indicated a break with previous ecumenical human 
rights engagement in emphatically including collective rights, such as ‘the Rights to Self-
Determination and to Cultural Identity’.99 Religious freedom was demoted to one right among others; 
as the WCC’s Executive Committee would put it in 1979, ‘if it speaks in universal terms, the church 
cannot isolate for priority consideration the question of its own religious freedom. Conversely, a church 
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which struggles for all rights for all people has, often with surprise, rediscovered something of its 
essential evangelical mission.’100  
The Nairobi Assembly connected ecumenical concerns in areas such as racism, sexism, and 
development to this capacious conception of human rights. Central to the WCC’s new approach was an 
analysis, inflected by Marxist and anticolonial modes of thinking, of the ‘root causes’ of human rights 
violations, which took the form of ‘unjust social structures, expressed through, e.g., economic 
exploitation, political manipulation, military power, class domination, psychological conditioning’, 
which ‘create the conditions under which human rights are denied’. The Assembly reiterated that each 
human being was ‘created in God’s image’, but also stated that to work for human rights meant ‘to 
work at the most basic level towards a society without unjust structures’.101 The WCC thus fused 
appeals to the dignity of the individual human being with a contentious interpretation of socio-political 
questions. 
Different interpretations have been offered as to how to understand the WCC’s recasting of 
human rights.
102
 Lehmann has argued that these years saw a process of ‘mainstreaming’ the concept of 
human rights within the WCC, whereby human rights were adopted as a ‘common denominator’ of 
WCC activities.
103
 Indeed, different departments and commissions of the WCC could (partly) reframe 
their work in terms of human rights. Albers has emphasised how the process of redefining human rights 
served to bring ecumenists from the North and South to ‘see eye to eye’ by speaking a shared 
language.
104
 Though not in relation to human rights specifically, Schilling has argued that the WCC’s 
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interaction with Christians from Latin America served to create an intermediary ‘third space (…) where 
theological and cultural differences were articulated and negotiated’.105  
These analyses point to a key feature of the human rights debate within the ecumenical 
movement at this time: to the ascendant representatives of the ‘revolutionary’ tradition, process 
mattered more than the achievement of a consensus outcome.
106
 Rather than attempting to identify 
issues from a putatively neutral or universal standpoint, priority was given to understanding opposing 
viewpoints. This was not only seen as a precondition for meaningful practical engagement but was also 
necessary as the basis for any true ecumenical fellowship. Shifting notions of ecumenical unity and 
mission over time enabled this reorientation: unity could be manifested in diversity, at least in theory, 
and mission should be conceived of as global rather than directed from the West to Third World 
mission fields. As the WCC’s new General Secretary, Philip Potter, from the British-associated 
Caribbean state of Dominica, quoted the 1973 Bangkok World Mission Conference: ‘the diversity of 
responses to Christ is essential precisely because they are related to particular situations and are thus 
relevant and complementary’.107  
Thus, even though a text like the Nairobi Assembly’s report on ‘Structures of Injustice and 
Struggles for Liberation’ suggested agreement, it straddled divergent positions. This lack of a unified 
agenda went hand in hand with a diffusion of agency away from the CCIA and towards other WCC 
bodies, as well as towards ecclesiastical organizations at the national and local levels.
108
 In the 
increasingly polycentric ecumenical landscape of the 1970s, such diffusion was embraced and even 
encouraged by the CCIA, which – in the spirit of Nairobi’s emphasis on ‘participation’ – stimulated the 
agency of local actors and acted as a global coordinator and clearinghouse, for instance by co-
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organising regional consultations on human rights.
109
 In practice, then, and in a fundamental 
reorientation from the CCIA’s earlier efforts to universalise its definition of religious freedom, the new 
ecumenical approach invited the ‘vernacularising’ (to adopt a phrase from Mark Philip Bradley) of 
human rights as circumstances required.
110
 As a wide range of ecumenical conferences and documents 
from the 1970s show, this reorientation meant that whereas previously it had served as a primarily legal 
language, human rights at this time became a theologically-laden concept in its own right, and a core 
element of ecumenical social ethics.
111
  
  
Conclusions 
The account of ecumenical human rights advocacy from the 1940s to the 1970s given here shows that 
there existed a significant strand of Christian human rights engagement over the course of this period. 
Further research on the extent to which the language of human rights ‘trickled down’ from the work of 
the CCIA and the WCC is needed, but the extensive contacts with church leaders and missionaries 
suggest that human rights discourse spread far and wide, if perhaps not always deep. It is important, in 
this respect, to keep in mind the distinction between ecumenical leaders and their constituencies.  
What is most important about this story is how the meaning of human rights changed over time. 
Initially, the CCIA’s advocacy of religious freedom showed how a distinctly Christian understanding of 
this concept could be married with the secularised human rights of the UN. While the UN’s 
formulation of human rights was universal, the ecumenical movement’s primary concern in the post-
war decades was with its co-religionists, whereas political Catholicism and Islam were each seen as 
potentially ‘totalitarian’ threats. The CCIA’s activity in decolonising Muslim countries illustrates how 
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the missionary movement’s interest in the freedom of evangelisation, as well as concern for the 
position of Christian minorities, was a major factor in its turn to human rights. The case of Italy, on the 
other hand, highlights the limits of the appeal of human rights, as efforts to implement and reform the 
constitution relied mostly on other means. All three cases show how the CCIA and its contacts at the 
national level strategically mixed human rights language with appeals tailored to specific national 
contexts.  
The CCIA’s focus on establishing constitutional religious freedom provisions testifies to the 
priority it accorded to the domestic sphere, whereas international human rights politics were only seen 
to play a corrective role. This complicates the distinction often made in the historiography of human 
rights between international and national rights language. The CCIA’s approach can best be understood 
as a religious variant of what Roland Burke, echoing Samuel Moyn, has recently described as the 
distinctively ‘nationalist species of internationalism’ that dominated UN-centred human rights 
advocacy from the 1940s onwards, which ‘marked the final renovation of a liberal nationalist tradition 
and a renewed confidence in the potential for the sovereign state, were it to be properly constituted’.112 
 The understanding of human rights developed by the WCC in the early 1970s, on the other hand, 
was capacious and pluralistic, as opposed to focused and universalising. It rejected the notion of an 
international ethos for a contextual one, and framed liberation in communitarian terms. Whereas the 
emphasis since 1948 had been on individual rights, conceived of as universal and pursued through the 
international institutions of the post-war order, the new approach saw human rights as an open-ended 
concept that could be reshaped and deployed to further a plurality of emancipatory projects. Even 
though the WCC still saw the UN and nascent regional human rights regimes as fora through which 
change could be achieved, it now conceived of human rights as primarily a moral rather than a legal 
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concept. This theological embrace of human rights represented a paradoxical return to a religious 
conception of rights, which had declined in the 1940s.  
The emphasis on transnational co-operation that characterised the WCC’s new approach 
mirrored the contemporaneous rise of grassroots human rights organisations. Yet its explicitly religious 
nature set it apart from more secular forms of activism, and its communitarian frame distinguished it 
from the individualistic focus of ascendant liberal organisations such as Amnesty International, which 
focused on individual cases of imprisonment, with minimal attention to political context.
113
 The WCC, 
by contrast, turned towards an approach shaped by liberation theologies that aimed at both spiritual and 
social transformation and thus emphatically called attention to the roots of human rights violations. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the churches’ engagement in their own societies contrasted sharply with 
Amnesty, which banned its members from working on their own country, to preserve their 
‘impartiality’. Burke has written that in the 1970s there were ‘two poles’ in human rights advocacy, one 
of which was exemplified by Amnesty, the other by the ‘New Internationalism’, exemplified by calls 
for a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO). In Burke’s view, the latter ‘drifted to grand 
impersonal structures and high abstractions, all of which were to enhance sovereign power to “do 
good”  (a questionable proposition, given the authoritarianism of its chief proponents) and to create the 
conditions under which human rights would be realized’.114 The WCC can be understood as charting a 
course between these two poles: it sought to address the structural causes of injustice while steering 
clear of the NIEO’s authoritarian tendencies. The history of its engagement thus highlights the diversity 
of human rights discourse in the 1970s.
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